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Abstract 
Using a unique data set on the cross-border merger and acquisition activities of the public companies listed at Chinaÿs stock 
exchanges, we show that pre-acquisition performance and proportion of the state shares have a positive impact on performance of 
acquiring companies. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past thirty years China has experienced a rapid economic growth. In that period, a large number of Chinese 
enterprises have grown up and gained competiveness, a few have even ventured abroad to search for new sources of 
growth. One way of international expansion is to acquire existing businesses abroad, so called cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). Although the number was low and the scales were small in the recent past, the trend is 
clearly picking up. It warrants a close look at this phenomenon to gain a better understanding on this matter. 
Cross-border M&A refers to a corporate action of purchasing the shares or assets of another company in a foreign 
country. Obviously, cross border M&A is a transaction of control rights between companies in two or more 
countries. Although the goals of cross-border M&A are often said to be creating value for the shareholders of 
acquiring companies, the results are far apart from the stated objective. Systematic studies show a considerable 
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions end up in failure. In addition to differences in market environments 
between home and host countries, the competitive and comparative advantages of the acquiring companies are 
considered more important. Those advantages include corporate governance, top management term competence, 
learning ability, among others. Therefore, itÿs necessary to take a look at the firm specific factors that influence the 
performance of cross-boarder M&A. The main purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence the 
outcomes of cross-border M&A made by Chinese firms in recent years, particularly, economic performance of the 
acquiring firms. 
The scale of cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms has increased steadily in recent years. 
According to the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, cross-border mergers and acquisitions by 
Chinese firms totaled US$ 8.139 billion in the period of 1988 to 2003, most of which occurred after 1997. While the 
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average amount each year was only $ 216 million between 1988 and 2003, it reached the level of $ 1.647 billion in 
2003. There are a few well publicized cases: Shanghai Electric Group purchased a Japanese printing machine 
manufacturer in 2002, TCL acquired Schneider in Germany in 2003 and Lenovo purchased PC business of IBM in 
2004. All these cases show Chinese enterprises have entered an era of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
The economic performance of acquiring firms differs as a result of such corporate action. Some of the differences 
may relate to the motives of the international expansion. For example, some companies do it because of competitive 
pressure at home market, while others seek resources such as raw materials and technologies, and probably a few are 
even encouraged by government policy measures. Despite the variety in their motives, many companies 
underestimate difficulties and integration risks in cross-border M&A and don’t have a clear idea about success 
factors that contribute to the difference in performance. Therefore it is imperative to have a good understanding of 
the relationship between performance of Chinese overseas mergers and acquisitions and determinant factors. 
Although the issue is clearly important, many serious academic studies are hard to find. A systematic search 
through the website of the China National Knowledge Infrastructure that lists all academic journals published in 
China give us nearly one thousand articles on cross-boarder M&A. Most are merely reviews of existing theories, 
descriptions of current situations or simple case studies. 
Our study attempts to analyze systematically economic performance and its determinants of cross border M&A 
made by Chinese companies in recent years. In addition to contribute to cross-border M&A literature, we also hope 
that the findings can provide useful guidance to outward foreign direct investment by Chinese enterprises in the 
future. 
Cross-border M&A is not new. What this paper intends to contribute is to explain the firm level factors and 
performance of overseas M&A by Chinese enterprises. Because the M&A performance are influenced by multiple 
factors, we adopt a multiple theoretical perspectives, specifically, organization learning perspective and agency 
theory. 
As we discussed early, we have not yet found a well developed database on the cross-border M&A, therefore we 
develop on our own a database covering 165 M&A cases by searching through various data sources including 
company websites, annual reports, newspapers, and the internet. 
The paper is organized as follows. The features of cross-border M&A activities of Chinese firms are discussed in 
section 2. After a short literature review, a number of hypotheses are developed based on a number of theoretical 
perspectives. Section 4 discusses the methodology and results are reported in section 5 before the concluding 
remarks. 
2. Features of Cross-border M&A by Chinese Companies 
Cross-border M&A by Chinese companies began in the 1980s, with most of the target companies located in the 
US, Canada and Hong Kong. The firms involved were basically large state-owned enterprises, such as CITIC, 
SINOCHEM, Capital Steel and China Resources. For example, Beijing Capital Steel Group purchased 70% shares 
of an American engineering company MASTA for US $3.4 millions in July 1988. In the 1990s, more and more 
Chinese companies start engaging acquisitions overseas. In addition to the state-owned enterprises, privately and 
collectively owned enterprises also joint the game. After entering into the 21 century, Chinese firms become more 
aggressive in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, several large cases occurred, such as the purchase of Korean 
company Ssang Yong Motor Company by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation and the purchase of PC 
business of IBM by Lenovo. 
Anecdotal observations show a few tendencies: 1) volume and sum of transactions increase over time. Figure.1 
shows amounts of money involved in that cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises. Although 
the amounts of money involved vary over the years, but the trend is going up. 2) The purchasing method extended 
from cash offer into various kinds of payments, such as leveraged acquisitions and swap of equity shares. For 
example, TCL used the methods of asset injection and shares swap in its acquisition of Thompson of France. 3) 
Although the state-owned corporations dominate in big cross-border M&A deals, collectedly owned and private 
enterprises also become active in recent years. 4) The industries covered extended from domestically monopolized 
industries such as energy, chemicals to manufacturing industry in general.  
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3. Literature Review 
There is a vast literature on both domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, mostly based on the 
experiences from developed countries. There are a few Chinese scholars have studied mergers and acquisitions case 
in domestic markets. For example, Feng and Wu (2001), using accounting data and factor analysis, formulate an 
overall evaluation function of corporate performance. They do not find significant change in firm performance in the 
year of M&A, but the performance improves in the year after and falls back in the third year. Zhu and Wang (2002) 
analyze improvement of return on equity (ROE) and returns on assets (ROA) for both acquirer and target companies 
in 67 mergers and acquisitions cases in 1998. Zhang (2003), using event study method and accounting analytical 
method, analyzes the mergers, acquisitions and reorganizations of Chinese publicly listed companies. He found that 
mergers, acquisitions and reorganizations add value to the target company, but had a negative influence upon 
shareholders’ income and financial performance in the acquiring company. Jia (2003) reports a reverse U shape 
relationship exists between performance of acquiring companies and their previous acquisition experience. We do 
not find empirical study on cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese companies. In the following section, 
we are going to develop a few hypotheses based on the prevailing theories on possible factors that influence the 
performance of cross-border M&A cases. 
4. Hypotheses Development 
The outcomes of cross-border M&A depends at least on 2 broad factors. First of all, it depends on external 
environment, such as economic growth and degree of competition at home country, changes of political and cultural 
environment of host country and so on. Secondly, it depends on resources and capability of the acquiring company. 
It is the latter that we are going to focus on. A few hypotheses therefore are developed to reflect the relations 
between acquiring firm characteristics and performance of cross-border M&A. 
 
4.1 Pre-Acquisitions Performance of Acquiring Firms 
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Allocation of control rights and possible synergy are often used to explain pre-acquisition performance and 
acquisition behavior. They are also used to explain post-acquisition performance for both acquiring and target firms. 
Weston et al. (1990) proposes that synergy effect is one of the main sources in which acquisition adds value, which 
means economic efficiency can improve after mergers of firms with different management capabilities. A relatively 
efficient bidder purchases a less efficient target firm and increases the value of the merged firm through improving 
target firm’s effectiveness. 
From target firm perspective, market for corporate control theory argues that it is the difference between a 
company’s market value and its actual value that determines whether a firm will be acquired. Moreover, the 
difference of management efficiency between the acquiring firm and the target firm determines the target company
ÿs post-acquisition performance. From the acquiring firmÿs viewpoint, market for corporate control theory 
predicts that pre-acquisition performance of the acquitting firm is positively related to its acquisition performance. 
For example, Lang et al. (1989) found that in tender offers, Tobin Q value of acquiring firms and shareholders’ 
interests are positively related. Servaes (1991) found both acquirer’s and acquired company’s shareholdersÿ gains 
are positively associated with the Tobin Q value of the acquirer. In these studies, Tobinÿs Q, defined as the market 
value of a company divided by its replacement cost, is used as an indicator of a companyÿs pre-acquisition 
performance and management capacity. Hereby we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Pre-acquisition performance of Chinese company (the acquirer) and its cross-border 
acquisition performance are positively related. 
 
4.2 Free Cash Flow 
Agency theory describes that the relationship between shareholders and managers as a principal-agent 
relationship. The principal and agent have different and often conflict interests. A manager considers his own 
interest first when making decisions that may not at the best of interest of shareholders. Jensen & Meckling (1983) 
define a firm as a nexus of contracts, contending that agency cost is unavoidable in public companies. 
One kind of agency costs is associated with the magnitude of free cash flow that refers to the amount of cash left 
in the company after covering the need of all investment projects with positive net present value. Large amounts of 
free cash flow can cause higher agency cost when corporate governance of acquiring company is imperfect. When a 
company has a large free cash flow but no or just a little debt, shareholders and managers may face a serious conflict 
in interests regarding dividend policy. In order to maximize their interests, managers prefer not distributing the free 
cash as dividend payout and to keep free cash flow within the company. Therefore they can use that cash not only 
for their personal private benefits or over-investment, but also for compensation of possible losses in the future 
(Jensen, 1986). If there is no good control system in place to ensure efficiency in operations, free cash flow may 
lead to high agency cost. Under that circumstance, acquisition cannot be a sound decision. On the other hand, free 
cash flow is redistributable financial resource thus released in acquisitions, and put it into more productive use. 
Jensen also predicts the characteristics of the free cash flow concentrated industries, showing that the free cash 
flow can be a serious problem for companies with large amounts of free cash flow and low growth prospect, and 
especially essential for companies doomed to shrink. These companies face the most serious situation for wasting 
cash on investments in nonprofitable projects. 
We argue free cash flow can cause the same agency cost in China’s publicly listed companies. Dividend payout 
lowers the resources under manager’s control; therefore managers prefer using free cash flow to invest instead of 
dividend payment, even though such investment may not generate positive returns to shareholders. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that acquiring company with sufficient cash flow before acquisition has poor postacquisition 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Pre-acquisition free cash flow Chinese company (the acquirer) and its acquisition 
performance are negatively related. 
 
4.3 State Owned Shares 
Corporate governance, with ownership structure as its essential part, is an important determinant for economic 
performance of the company. In China, as majority of listed companies are transformed state-owned enterprises, the 
state owned shares and legal person shares are much large than the public shares, resulting in so-called insider 
6900  Wu Changqi and Xie Ningling / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 6896–6905 
control. Therefore, we must take into consideration the state share proportion as one of important characteristics in 
listed companies in China. 
In many state-owned enterprises, the responsibilities of the top management teams and state owner are not clearly 
delineated. Because the state cannot exercise its rights of effectively monitoring and controlling managersÿ 
behavior, the managers have free hand to pursue their own interests. These rewards are highly related to their power, 
position and size of the company they manage, which generate incentives fro the managers to acquire assets and 
enlarge company’s size. Moreover, because there is weak punishment mechanism for the managers, managerÿs 
short-term acquisition may occur. In addition, small shareholders and debt holders are not able to monitor managers
ÿ behavior effectively, which gives additional incentive for managers to make acquisition for their private benefits 
rather than improving companies’ performance. Hence, we formulate hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Proportion of the state shares in Chinese company and post cross border acquisition 
performance are negatively related. 
 
4.4 Organizational Age 
The perspective of organization learning theory is that companies can learn from their own history or otherÿs 
experiences (Cyert & March, 2001). Based on this viewpoint, a number of studies are carried out to test the impact 
of pre-acquisition experiences of the firms on acquisition performance (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 
2002; Zollo & Singh, 2004). 
Hitt et al. (1998) propose that, firms that have experienced acquisition or reshuffle will be more flexible in 
management and more suitable for change. It is because acquisition requires both acquirer and target firms to 
continuously make improvement (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and thus their structural flexibility will enable post-
acquisition restructuring goes more smoothly. Previous acquisition experiences can at least bring changes in firmsÿ 
information system, remuneration system, strategic planning, control system and reporting structure, hence so-called 
synergy effect of acquisition will be better achieved. In addition, past experiences also help firms to choose the right 
target company and to execute better negotiations. Han (2002) reaches the same conclusion after analyzing 91 
Korean companies in China and finds a firm with more internationalization experiences makes better post 
acquisition performance than those with limited experiences. 
Pugh et al. (1969) show experienced firms typically go through more changes and gain more experiences than 
newly established companies; these experiences become part of the companies’ assets. Fowler & Schmidt (1989) 
find that organizational age is positively associated with excess returns of a company. Hence, we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Organizational age of acquiring firm and performance of the cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are positively related. 
 
There must be other factors that also contribute to post M&S performance, here we focus out study on the above 
mentioned factors and leave room for future studies because of data insufficiency. 
To sum up, the performance of cross border M&A by Chinese enterprise is affected by its pre-acquisition 
performance, free cash flow, state share proportion and organizational age. We will testify these hypotheses in the 
followings section using the data we collected. 
5. Research Methodology 
5.1 Data Sample 
The focus of our research is to gain understanding on the determinants of performance of cross-border M&A by 
Chinese companies. After extensive search, we do not find an existing database that can be used for that purpose. 
Hence, we construct our own database by searching a number of sources, including China Acquisition Report 
2000—2006, China Business and 21st Century Business Herald, annual reports and press releases on website of 
related company, and China Acquisition Net. After an extensive search, we find 91 companies made 165 cross-
border acquisitions in period of 2000ü2006. Among which, 61 companied are publicly listed companies in two the 
stock exchanges in China. 
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Because accounting and financial information is relatively easy to get, we therefore include only M&A cases 
initiated by listed firms in China in our final sample. 
To be included in the sample, the acquiring firms must meet the following criteria: 
 
(1) Acquirers must be listed companies at Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
(2) Only the last acquisition record will be used if a listed firm has made more than one acquisition activities within one year. 
(3) Listed firms in the sample must not have reservation on their financial statements from auditors to ensure the credibility of 
the financial data.  
 
That eventually leads to sample size of 32. The financial information comes from Sinofin Database that contains 
detailed financial information for listed companies in China, supplemented by relevant companies’ annual reports 
that have enough financial data in the period of 1998 to 2006. 
 
5.2 Variables 
(1) Dependent Variable 
In this study we use increase rate of ROA as dependent variable to measure cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions performance: 
A number of studies such Lang et al. (1989) use event study method that measures stock price movement after 
the M&A events are announced based on premise of efficient capital market. Stock markets in China are at its 
infancy hence, the movements of stock prices are subject to more to manipulation and public policy changes instead 
of a good indicator for individual company performance. In addition, the shares of listed companies are divided into 
the categories of tradable shares and non-tradable shares, and holders of the latter control the company. Values of 
non-tradable share cannot be easily equal to share prices of the tradable shares, so changes of stock price may not 
represent the change of shareholdersÿ value over all. Therefore, we use accounting information informant instead 
in this study. 
The actual measure is difference of ROA two years after M & A minus ROA in the year before M & A took 
place, and then divided by ROA in the year before:(ROA2-ROA-1)/ROA-1 
The reason for using ROA of the two year after M & A is that, in the literature, it is generally accepted that 
mergers and acquisitions performance cannot be shown immediately until the second year after; costs typically 
increase in the year of mergers and acquisitions and the first year after it is an integration period when a lot of 
investments are still needed. So, ROAs in these two years are not good indicagtors. 
(2) Independent Variables 
Pre-acquisition performance: Following Morck et al. (1990), we use logarithm of increase of net income of 
acquirer two years before to that of the one year before the acquisition to measure pre-acquisition performance. That 
is, 
lnRNetIncome = ln(Net Profit-1/Net Profit-2) 
Free cash flow: Ratio of net cash flow in the last year to total capital of the last year. In this way, impact of 
company scale can be controlled, Cash/TotalCap. 
Proportion of the state owned shares: The number is acquired by adding shares proportion of state share or state 
legal person share in top 10 non-tradable shares shareholders in the year of mergers and acquisitions, RSTATEH. 
Organizational age: The time span from the establishment of the company to the year of mergers and 
acquisitions, AGE. 
(3) Control Variable 
Industry dummy: Because of limit sample side, we only use a broad industry classification at two digit level to 
control the industry effect. Because about 70% of these companies belong to manufacturing industry, we use a 
dummy variable to put all firms into manufactory industry (1) and non manufacturing industry (0) 
 
5.3 Econometric Model 
We employ a multivariable linear regression model to test those proposed hypotheses: 
Increase Rate of ROA˙¢+£1 Increase Rate of Net Income +£ Ratio of Net Cash Flow to total capital £3 
Rate of State Share £4 No of Years from Firmÿs Establishment to Acquisition £5 Industry; 
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Table 3  Summary of Variables 
 
Hypothesis Variables Definitions Expected signs of 
coefficients 
Chinese companyÿs pre-
acquisition performance 
and its acquisition 
performance are positively 
related. 
lnRNetIncome Ln (Net Profit-1/Net 
Profit-2) 
+ 
Chinese companyÿs pre-
acquisition free cash flow 
and its acquisition 
performance are 
negatively related. 
Cash/TotalCap Net Free Cash Flow-
1/Total Asset-1 
_ 
The state share proportion 
and acquisition 
performance are 
negatively related. 
RSTATEH Proportion of state shares 
and legal person shares 
_ 
Organizational age and 
acquisition performance 
are positively related. 
AGE Year since the 
establishment of the firm 
to the time of acquisition 
ˇ 
 
The subscripts 1ǃ0ǃ1ǃ2 refer to one year before acquisition, the year of acquisition, one year after 
acquisition and two years after acquisition respectively. 
6. Empirical Results 
The results of analysis are summarized in Tables 4-6. 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. There are a few points that worthwhile to mentioning. 
Table 4 reveals (1) Majorities of cross-border mergers and acquisitions are in manufacturing industry. (2) More 
established firms engage in cross-border acquisitions. Although organization experiences vary from 8 years to 102 
years, the average age before acquisition is 34 years. (3) The proportions of the state share vary widely with a few 
non-state firms in our sample, although the average of state share is 42%. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 No Minimum Maximum Means S.D. 
1 INDUS3 32 0 1 .63 .492 
2 AGE 32 8 102 34.75 25.648 
3 ROA(2ü1) 32 -23.842 8.141 -1.196 4.935 
4 lnRNetIncome 32 -.606 1.349 .202 .450 
5 Cash/TotalCap 32 -.057 .213 .085 .061 
6 RSTATEH 32 .00 77.43 42.075 28.848 
Table 5 shows that there are statistically significant relations between dependent (Increase Rate of ROA) and 
increase rate of net income as well as rate of state share, consistent to the hypothesis. 
 
Table 5 Correlation Coefficients 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 INDUS3 1      
2 AGE .110 1     
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3 ROA(2ü1) .237 .293 1    
4 lnRNetIncome .007 .114 .311* 1   
5 Cash/TotalCap -.270 -.078 .150 .009 1  
6 RSTATEH -.094 .278 .311* -.111 -.102 1 
*p˘0.05, **p˘0.01 
 
The main results of the regression analysis are summarized in Table 6 report. The result shows our model can 
explain a large portion of the performance variance of firms in sample from the values of R2=0.378, Adjusted 
R2=0.254. the overall regression equation is statistically significant with F value of 3.043. 
 
Table 6 Multivariable Regression Analysis 
 
Model Variable Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
  B Std. 
Error 
Beta T Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 Constant -9.661 2.501  3.863 .001   
 INDUS3 3.300 1.688 .321 1.955 .062 .923 1.083 
 AGE .029 .032 .150 .906 .374 .903 1.108 
 lnRNet 
Income 
3.655 1.782 .329 2.051 .051 .967 1.034 
 Cash/ 
TotalCap 
23.348 13.688 .281 1.706 .100 .917 1.091 
 RSTATEH .064 .029 .364 2.183 .039 .894 1.119 
R2˙0.378˗F˙3.043˗Sig=0.028. 
  
The results show the pre-acquisitions performance of Chinese acquiring company is statistically positively related 
to the cross border acquisitions performance. As Lang et al. (1989), Servaes (1991), and Morck et al. (1990) show, 
superior performance of the acquiring company denotes high management efficiency, effective acquisition policies 
and in turn improves acquisition performance. A steady growth of pre-acquisition net revenue of a Chinese firm is 
an indication that the company is well managed, and such management competence can be extended to combined 
company. 
Empirical result also shows that coefficient of variable cash/capital, an indicator for the pre-acquisition free cash 
flow, is positive, but statistically insignificant. That means the free cash flow hypothesis proposed is rejected. One 
possible explanation for that result is the large cash flows are not necessarily free in the sense that the post-
acquisition integration process may need a large amount of cash. Therefore, it is possible to believe that pre-
acquisition free cash flows will have positive effect on cross border acquisition performance. 
The result shows proportion of the stat shares in the listed companies is positively related to overseas acquisition 
performance. The sign of coefficient is contradictory with predication of the hypothesis. There are a few 
explanations to this result. First, although the administrative characteristic of the state as a shareholder may 
negatively affect firms’ overseas acquisition performance, these firms enjoy favorable government policies. Second, 
firms with a large proportion of state shares and legal person shares have a relative high concentration of ownership 
and may draw close supervisions from major shareholders. Activities such as cross border acquisitions must undergo 
strict examination and approval of departments such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchanges. However, owners of tradable share are mostly 
small private investors. The private investors may not care much about firmÿs long-term performance given the 
volatile and speculative nature of Chinese stock markets. Third, firms with a high proportion of the state shares are 
often operating in industries characterized as monopoly with rich resources. From this perspective, the higher the 
proportion of state share is, the stricter the government supervision, and the fewer irrational acquisitions, which is 
beneficial to improvement of overseas acquisition performance. This is consistent with argument put forward by 
Qian et al. (1995) that the government exercise direct supervision to operation of state-owned firms through 
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supervising and appointing managers, becoming one of the reasons why China has fewer problems of insider control 
than firms of Eastern European countries. Therefore, a higher proportion of state share will have positive effects on 
overseas acquisition performance of Chinese firms. 
Finally, organizational age is in slightly positive relation to overseas acquisition performance of Chinese firms, 
which is consistent with the previous hypothesis, that is, organization learning enables firms to improve and develop 
new technologies and knowledge, promoting the creation of intangible assets, which is the basis of continuing 
competitiveness. The longer a firm’s history, the more changes it has experienced, and the adaptable it is to reforms, 
which is good for a firm to pursue cross border acquisitions and improve its performance. However, whether this 
experience transfer can happen largely depends on the firm’s ability to learn and reflect as well as the similarity 
between previous experience and current acquisitions. 
These results are useful to understand cross border acquisitions of Chinese firms, but because of the limited 
sample size and exploratory nature of Chinese firmsÿ cross-boarder M&A activities, the impact on the overall 
performance of the acquiring companies may be hard to interpret. We have to be cause to generalize these results. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Using a unique dataset of listed companies, this research analyzes factors that influence performance of cross 
border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises, including managerial capability of acquirer, free cash flow, 
proportion of state shares of listed companies, and organization learning ability. 
We show pre-acquisition performance and proportion of the state owned shares has a positive impact on the 
performance of Chinese companies cross border M&A. Corporate age and free cash flow do not have statistically 
significant impact on such performance. 
The significance of this research is to fill the research gap on cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese 
firmsÿ overseas mergers and acquisition despite the rapid increases in both number and scale of such activities in 
the last ten years. This study not only contributes to the international business literature, it also generates some 
business policy implications 
There are certainly limitations in this research. First of all, we have only studied publicly listed companies that 
account only a small number of firms, lots of mergers and acquisitions occur for no-listed companies, which donÿt 
have mandatory requirements for information disclosures. Itÿs recommended that long-term tracking of overseas 
mergers and acquisitions of enterprises should be done in future research. 
Additionally, industrial effect could be controlled better in future studies. In a number of industries, it appears 
that the frequencies of cross-border mergers and acquisitions are high (energy, machine tools, automobiles, 
electronic products). 
Above all when internationalization of Chinese firms expands, there must be a lot more of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. We can continue our pursuit to have a better understanding for this important issue. 
 
References 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review, 14(1): 57-74. 
Feng, Genfu and Linjiang Wu, 2001. Empirical Study of Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions of Chinese Public Companies. Economic 
Research, 1, in Chinese. 
Fowler, K. L. & Schmidt, D. R., 1989. Determinants of tender offer post-acquisition financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 10 
(4): 339. 
Franks, J., R. Harris & S. Titman, 1991. The post-merger share-price performance of acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 29. pp.81-
96. 
Haleblian, J. & S. Finkelstein, 1999. The influence of organizational acquisition experience on acquisition performance: A behavioral 
perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (1): 29. 
Harrison J. S., M. A. Hitt, R. E. Hoskisson & R. D. Ireland, 1991. Synergies and Post Acquisition Performance: Differences Versus Similarities 
in Resource Allocations. Journal of Management, 17: 173-190. 
Hayward, M. L. A., 2002. When do firms learn from their acquisition experience? Evidence from 1990—1995. Strategic Management Journal, 
23 (1): 21. 
Hitt, M., Harrison, J., Ireland, R. D., & Best, A., 1998. Attributes of Successful and Unsuccessful Acquisitions of US Firms. British Journal of 
Management, 9 (2): 91. 
Wu Changqi and Xie Ningling / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 6896–6905 6905
Jemison, D. B. & Sitkin, S. B., 1986. Corporate Acquisitions: A Process Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 11: 145-163. 
Jensen, M. C. & W. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, M. C., 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76: 323-329. 
Jensen, M. C., 1988. Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2: 21-48. 
Jia Changjie, 2003.Influence of Previous Mergers and Acquisitions upon Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions. Quantitative and Technical 
Economics Research. 12, in Chinese. 
Kroll, M., Wright, P., Toombs, L., & Leavell, H., 1997. Form of control: A critical determinant of acquisition performance and CEO rewards. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18 (2): 85. 
Kusewitt, Jr, J. B., 1985. An exploratory study of strategic acquisition factors relating to performance. Strategic Management Journal, 6(2): 151-
169. 
Lang, L. H. P., R. M. Stulz & R. A. Walkling, 1989. Managerial performance, Tobin’s Q, and the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 24 (1): 137-154. 
Loderer, C. & K. Martin, 1992. Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms. Financial Management, 21(3): 69-77. 
Lubatkin, M., 1983. Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm. Academy of Management Review, 8(2): 218-225. 
Martin, K.& J.J. McConnell, 1991. Corporate performance, corporate takeover and management turnover. Journal of Finance, 46: 671-687. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, & R. W. Vishny, 1990. Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 45 (1): 31. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook. China Statistics Publishing House, various years. 
Pugh, D. S., D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, & C. Turner, 1969. The context of organizational structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, 14: 91-
114. 
Qian, Yinyi and Aoki, M, 1995. Corporate Governance Structure during Transition Economy: Insider Control and Function of Bank. China 
Economic Publishing House, in Chinese. 
Servaes, H., 1991. Tobin’s Q and gains from takeovers. Journal of Finance, 46 (1): 409-419. 
Shinn, E. W., 1999. Returns to acquiring firms: The role of managerial ownership, managerial wealth, and outside owners. Journal of Economics 
& Finance, 23 (1): 78. 
Singh, H. & C. A. Montgomery, 1987. Corporate Acquisition Strategies and Economic Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 8, pp.377-
386. 
Wang, Wei. China Mergers and Acquisitions Report. various years, Postal and Telecommunication Press, in Chinese. 
Weston, J. Fred, Kwang S. Chung and Susan E. Hoag, 1990. Mergers, Restructuring and Corporate Control, Prentice Hall. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Development. 
Zhang, Xin, 2003, Whether Mergers and Acquisitions and Reorganization can Create Value. Economic Research, 6, in Chinese. 
Zhu, Baoxian and Yikai Wang, 2002. Effect Analysis of Chinese Publish Improvement of Mergers and Acquisitions Practice 1998. Economic 
Research, 11, in  Chinese. 
                                                          
i A research grant by the National Science Foundation of China on its key project “Internationalization Strategy of Chinese Enterprises” 
(No.70532005) is acknowledged. Correspondent: topdog@gsm.pku.edu.cn. 
